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“Murky Protectionism” in Europe: 
How Should Binding Rules Be 
Evaluated in Tough Times?
European governments have reacted to the worst Continent-wide deterioration in eco-nomic performance in several generations with a plethora of interventions. Not all of 
these interventions are nationality-blind, that is, some seek to overtly or covertly discrimi-
nate against foreign commercial entities or workers. Worse, as Richard Baldwin and I have 
recently argued (in our recent voxEU collection of such matters titled “The collapse of 
global trade, murky protectionism, and the crisis: Recommendations for the G20”, avail-
able at www.voxeu.org), some of the very measures taken to stimulate national econo-
mies have discrimination against foreigners buried within them. Fears about such “murky 
protectionism” are particularly hard to dispel, as it is far less transparent than overt trade 
policy measures such as tariffs and quotas. Politicians fi nd pressures to retaliate harder to 
resist when the mere accusation of foreign protectionism cannot be obviously and cost-
lessly rebutted. 
Resort to murky protectionism should be of great concern to anyone interested in the 
European project, whether they support the goals of integrating national markets or of 
avoiding strife among European Union members. To their credit certain European Commis-
sioners and political leaders in member states have spoken out against growing protec-
tionism in Europe. Still, recent developments have put advocates of European integration 
on the back foot, reacting defensively to a bewildering array of state initiatives. In a telling 
indication of the pressures involved, the European Commission relaxed its state aids rules 
in response to the crisis, or perhaps more accurately, in response to the realisation that it 
would have to take on almost all of the member states simultaneously in any balanced at-
tempt to enforce previously agreed rules on subsidies to private fi rms.
These developments in Europe raise the interesting question of what can be realisti-
cally expected of binding rules on state behaviour during such crises. Even though the 
multilateral trading system has binding rules, because of its elaborate set of supranational 
institutions (including courts) Europe perhaps provides the best region in which to assess 
the impact of binding rules in times of economic distress. Certainly, no defi nitive answer to 
this question may be available for years. Still, it is worth refl ecting on this question now as 
private and public sector expectations are conditioned by real or even apparent breaches 
of the rules. 
One hard-line perspective is that a breach of the rules during this crisis foreshadows 
future violations and, at a minimum, diffi culties in negotiating and enforcing new rules on 
non-discrimination in European commerce. If, so this argument might run, policymakers 
get into the habit of breaking EU rules then where will the process of unravelling stop? 
Could decades of reform efforts be undone? These are legitimate fears. Having said that, 
providing evidence for the proposition that political leaders in Europe have turned their 
back on integrated markets permanently would be diffi cult to muster. 
There is, of course, the alternative possibility that European leaders want to have their 
cake and eat it. That is, they want to discriminate in the short term but, once the crisis is 
over, revert to being upstanding citizens that recoil from protectionism. Plus, by disavow-
ing the more overt discriminatory tools long banned within European commerce (such as 
tariffs and quotas) and resorting to murkier devices instead, these political leaders may 
have persuaded themselves that they are not really breaking the rules. Moreover, they 
might misleadingly construe criticism of murky protectionism as criticism of government 
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intervention. Under these circumstances what can we expect from binding rules on non-
discrimination? 
At this point in the argument, as far as how these dynamics play out over time is con-
cerned it is worth noting a mismatch in the time taken for the European Commission and 
associated courts to make decisions and the time before national policymakers come un-
der substantial pressure to react to discriminatory “outrages” perpetrated by other gov-
ernments. This is where murky protectionism is at its most insidious. Given current media 
technologies information about such protectionism including accusations that it might be 
biased against foreign commerce can be transmitted instanteously, thus putting pressure 
almost immediately on other governments to retaliate. 
In contrast, the very fact that murky protectionism is buried inside an otherwise inno-
cent-looking government initiative means that it will take longer for the European Com-
mission and other neutral observers to analyse the measure. This is particularly the case 
when the measure taken does not explicitly state that foreign commercial entities are at 
a disadvantage, but where the discrimination arises upon implementation. One superfi -
cial solution might be to insist on binding rules that require pre-approval by the European 
Commission of a particular type of state measure. This will provide no comfort, howev-
er, when the discrimination occurs during implementation. Indeed, pre-approval clauses 
would provide an incentive to transform more overt protectionism into murkier, implemen-
tation-related alternatives.
Defending to the death a set of binding rules against discrimination may not be wise 
either, especially if in the interim many member states (in particular the largest member 
states) have chosen to break previously agreed commitments. Under these circumstances 
the defender – typically the European Commission – may trigger such an adverse reaction 
from the member states that the disciplines in question are not just broken but permanent-
ly removed from the rule book. However unpalatable it may seem, accepting some degree 
of discrimination may be prudent. A zero rate of infraction isn‘t the right benchmark for 
evaluating binding rules in times of crisis.
Even so, there may still be useful steps that the European Commission (and others 
charged with enforcing binding rules in other fora) could take. Even when interventions 
happen, securing agreement that they be time-limited and need to be reviewed before 
renewal would be an advance. More generally, developing “exit strategies” that allow gov-
ernments to unwind any measures without much fuss would be useful. 
Another innovation for future downturns might be to insist on “cooling off” periods that 
require that a certain period of time elapse (say 30 days) before a measure is implemented. 
These periods could stall retaliation if an intervening country can successfully explain to its 
peers that its measure is not discriminatory and has been designed in a way that its imple-
mentation is also unlikely to be discriminatory. 
The purpose of this editorial has been to ask what can realistically be expected of bind-
ing rules during a sharp economic downturn. Binding rules can include non-discriminatory 
standards against which government measures can be usefully evaluated. Indeed, the 
combination of these benchmarks, transparency and peer pressure, can be particularly 
useful. Having said that, there are practical reasons as to why the infractions will occur 
and this should colour the assessment of the impact of binding rules in troubled times. 
Instead, steps might be taken that discourage damaging retaliation in the fi rst place and 
promote the unwinding of discriminatory measures once favourable economic conditions 
are restored.
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